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ABSTRACT
     Platonist attitude of mathematicians to objects of their 
investigations is determined by the very nature of the mathematical 
method. The evolution of greek mathematics led to mathematical objects 
in the modern meaning of the word: the ideas of numbers, points, 
straight lines etc. s t a b i l i z e d and thus - were distracted 
from their real source - properties and relations of things in the 
real world. Mathematicians do not investigate the nature directly, 
they investigate some fixed notion of it, and during the investigation 
this notion is teated (subjectively) as the "last reality" without any 
"more fundamental" reality behind it. This sort of platonism is an 
essential aspect of mathematical method. Mathematicians are learned 
ability " t o   l i v e " in the "world" of mathematical concepts. 
Here we have the main source of the creative power of mathematics, and 
of its surprising efficiency in natural sciences and technique. In 
this way, "living" (sometimes - for many years) in the "world"of their 
concepts and models, mathematicians are learned to draw a maximum of 
conclusions from a minimum of premises.
     A fixed system of basic principles is the distinguishing property of 
every mathematical theory. A mathematical model of some natural 
process or technical device is essentially a  f i x e d  m o d e l 
 which can be investigated independently of its "original". We can 
change such a model (obtaining a new model) not only for the sake of 
correspondence to "original", but also for a mere experiment. In this 
way we obtain easily various "models at themselves". The fixed 
character of mathematical models makes such deviations possible and 
even inevitable.
     The fixed character of mathematical models is simultaneously the 
force and the weakness of mathematics: no concrete fixed model 
(theory) can solve all problems arising in science (or even in 
mathematics itself). An excellent confirmation of this dialectical 
thesis was given in the famous incompleteness theorem of K. Goedel.
     Only few people will dispute the fixed character of a fully 
axiomatized theory. But theories, which are not yet axiomatized - can 
they be fixed, too? Trying to explain this phenomenon, we are led to 
the concept of  i n t u i t i o n . Intuition is treated usually as 
something like "creative thinking" (see [1, 3]). But in real 
mathematical theories we have th emost elementary type of intuition - 
some unconscious "reasonable principles" ruling (together with the 
axioms, or without any axioms) our reasoning. We can say, therefore, 
that a theory (or model) can be fixed not only due to some system of 
axioms, but also due to a specific intuition.
     While investigations are going on, they can achieve the level of 
complexity, at which the degree of definiteness of intuitive models is 
already insufficient - because of inevitably uncontrollable nature of 
unconscious processes. The only reliable exit from such situations is 
following: we must convert (at least partly) the unconscious ruling 
"principles" into conscious ones. It appeared, however, that - after 
an explicit reconstruction - some of the concepts possess  u n e x p e 
c t e d  p r o p e r t i e s , missing in the original intuitive 
concepts. Thus, for example, a continuous function was constructed, 
which is everywhere nondifferentiable. The appearance of unexpected 
properties in reconstructed concepts means, that here we have indeed a 
reconstuction (not a direct "copying" of intuitive concepts).
     What criteria can be set for the adequacy of reconstructions? And 
how, at all, the adequacy of a reconstruction can be founded, if the 
original concept remains hidden in intuition and every attempt to get 
it out is a reconstruction itself with the same problem of adequcy? 
The only possible real answer is: to take into account only those 
aspects of intuitive concepts, which can be  r e c o g n i z e d  i n 
 p r a c t i c e  of mathematical reasoning.
     Goedel's incompleteness theoram has provoked very much talking about 
insufficiency of the axiomatic method for a true reconstruction of the 
"alive, informal" mathematical thinking (see [2]). In fact, it is 
nonsense to speak about the limited applicability of axiomatics: the 
limits of axiomatics coincide with the limits of mathematics itself.
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